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During the nineteenth century most state legislatures enacted
statutes which effectively outlawed abortion.1 Beginning in 1967,
some states liberalized their statutes,2 but abortion remained basi-
cally illegal.' Under the laws of most states a woman could ob-
tain a legal abortion only if a doctor certified that her life would
be endangered by continuation of the pregnancy. Then in 1973
the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,4 which held unconstitu-
* B.A., 1961, Texas Christian University; M.A.T., 1962, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D., 1975, Northwestern University.
1. R. SHAW, ABORTION ON TRIAL 43 (1968).
2. See George, The Evolving Law of Abortion, 23 CAsE W. REs. L. REv.
708, 732-49 (1972).
3. D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALIrr 140 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as CALLAHAN]. For a well-documented, brief summary of the
legal regulation of abortion prior to 1967, see George, The Evolving Law of
Abortion, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 708, 715 passim (1972), reprinted in ABOR-
TION, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 3, 7-17 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
Texts of the statutes as of 1961 are collected and reprinted in full, along with
citations to case law interpreting the statutes, in Quay, fustifiable Abortion, 40
GEo. L.J. 447-520 (1961).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
In Roe a pregnant woman brought a class action challenging the constitution-
ality of a Texas criminal abortion law, which proscribed abortions except for the
purpose of saving the mother's life. The Supreme Court held, through Justice
Blackmun, that the Texas law violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, which protects the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified
right to terminate her pregnancy, against state encroachment. -.ld. at 152-54.
That right was found not to be absolute, for the state has legitimate interests in
protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life.
Id. at 155-56. These interests become compelling at various stages of the preg-
nancy cycle. Id. at 162-63. During the first trimester the decision whether to
abort and how it is to be done must be left to the pregnant woman and her physi-
cian. Id. at 153, 164. For the next trimester, the state may regulate the abortion
procedure only as it relates to maternal health. Id. at 164. Finally, during the
last three months, when the fetus is presumably "viable" (see note 48 infra), the
state may regulate or proscribe all abortions except those necessary to protect the
life or health of the mother. 410 U.S. at 164-65.
As the Court indicated, id. at 165, the decision should be read with Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), decided the same day and holding that certain pro-
cedural requirements for abortions under Georgia's "liberal" statute were not ra-
tionally related to legitimate state interests, as outlined in Roe. See note 179 in-
fra.
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tional a state legislature's attempt to condition a woman's decision
to abort on her fulfilling various prerequisites. Abortion suddenly
became legal.
What factors explain this abrupt and radical change in the
law's approach to abortion? The following social and ethical con-
siderations may have been important: (1) the threat of overpopu-
lation;5 (2) the belief that unwanted pregnancies and unwanted
children pose an unreasonable limitation on a woman's personal
liberty;' (3) a feeling that new life is not necessarily the divinely
ordained aftermath of sexual intercourse; (4) the conviction that
a doctor should not be threatened with criminal sanctions for per-
forming a medical procedure which he believes to be in his pa-
tient's best interest ;7 (5) the recognition that criminal prosecu-
tions" for abortion are seldom brought, despite numerous viola-
tions of the law;9 and (6) the fact that while affluent women man-
age to obtain safe abortions, poor women are often butchered by
quacks.' ° All of these issues were dramatically accentuated by
the Sherry Finkbine case," by the newly discovered consequences
The Supreme Court did not reverse itself in Roe. The Court had never ruled
on an abortion statute prior to 1971, when it decided United States v. Vuitch, 402
U.S. 62 (1971). Vuitch upheld the Washington, D.C. abortion statute, under at-
tack for vagueness, on the ground that the law had been liberally construed by
the District of Columbia courts. See text accompanying notes 27-28 infra.
5. Corsa, Abortion-A World View, in TlE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION
Now 125-26 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967); PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON POPULA-
TION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, U.S. POPULATION GROWTH AND THE
AMERICAN FUTURE (THE ROCKEFELLER REPORT) (1972); D.H. MEADOWS, D.L.
MEADOWS, J. RANDERS, & W. BEHRENS, III, THE LIMITS OF GROWTH (1972).
6. See Louisell & Noonan, Constitutional Balance, in THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION 220, 235-36 (J. Noonan ed. 1970).
7. See Guttmacher, Abortion-Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, in THE
CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 1, 13-14 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967); Levy &
Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL.
L. REV. 123, 138-39 (1962); Hall, The Medico-Legal Aspects of Abortion,
CRIMINOLOGICA (1967), at 7.
8. See Guttmacher, The Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortion, in ABORTION
IN AMERICA 175, 180-84 (H. Rosen ed. 1967); L. LADER, ABORTION 70-73 (1966);
Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado About Nothing), 60 J. GRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 3, 8 (1969).
9. Dr. Harold Rosen considered the widespread violation of abortion statutes
in A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, the title of a chapter in his book, ABORTION
IN AMERICA 299-321 (1967). He estimated that 20 to 30 per cent of preg-
nancies end in abortion. For more recent estimates see CALLAHAN, supra note
3, at 132-36.
10. See, e.g., International Conference on Abortion, in THE TERRIBLE
CHTOICE: THE ABORTION DILEMMA 63-64 (R. Cooke ed. 1968); CALLAHAN, supra
note 3, at 136-39.
11. See L. LADER, ABORTION 10-16 (1966). Mrs. Finkbine, fearing she was
carrying a thalidomide-deformed fetus, had to travel to Sweden to obtain an abor-
tion. The aborted fetus was in fact deformed. See NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1962,
at 54.
[Vol. 15
1975] MORAL SENTIMENT IN ABORTION OPINIONS 593
of German measles, and by the active abortion reform movement
of the 1960's. 12
Most of these considerations bear a distinctively moral tone
and pose ethical problems. Thus it would not be surprising to
find moral sentiment lurking behind the seemingly "objective"
-opinions of the Supreme Court Justices in Roe. For, in granting
certiorari to the abortion cases, the Supreme Court chose to con-
front what was basically a moral issue.
But how did the High Court come to be involved in decid-
ing the metaphysical question of when human life begins? An
examination of the legislative and judicial history of abortion re-
form reveals a pattern of legislative avoidance and judicial activism
that led inevitably to Supreme Court review.
The History of Abortion Reform
Legislative reform was slow and painful, being politically
dangerous for the individual legislators." Few legislatures
seemed willing to repeal the laws completely. 4 And even the
New York State legislature, which in 1970 had passed "the most
liberal abortion law in the world,"' 5 voted to repeal it in 1972.
Only Governor Rockefeller's veto of the attempted repeal sal-
vaged this novel experiment in legislation.' 6 Furthermore, the
moderately liberal ALI model statute, 17 which was adopted in
more than a dozen states, did not automatically increase the num-
ber of legal abortions, partly because the statutes gave doctors no
12. For an insider's account of the reform and repeal movements, especially
in the legislatures, see L. LADER, ABORTION (1966); L. LADER, ABORTION II
(1973).
13. See, e.g., L. LADER, ABORTION II 56-70, 122-48, 170-73 (1973); N.Y.
Times, May 14, 1972, at 62, col. 3.
14. Four states eliminated all substantive qualifications on medically per-
formed abortions within defined time limits. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970);
HAWAII REV. LAWS tit. 25 § 453-16 (Supp. 197-1); N.Y. PENAL LAws c. 40,
§ 125.05(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.070 (Supp.
1970).
15. Guttmacher called the New York statute the most "liberal abortion law
in the world." Guttmacher, The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in New York:
A Personal Insight, in ABORTION, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 63, 71 (D. Walbert &
J. Butler eds. 1973).
16. L. LADER, ABORTION 11 196-208 (1973).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) authorized
termination of pregnancy on any of the following three grounds (with approval
by other doctors): (1) that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair
the physical or mental health of the mother; (2) that the child would be born
with a grave physical or mental defect; and (3) that the pregnancy resulted from
rape, incest, or felonious intercourse, defined to include illicit intercourse with a
girl below the age of sixteen. For a discussion of the implications of the ALI
proposals, see Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49
GEo. U. 173-256, 395-538 (1961).
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firm assurance of immunity from prosecution,' and partly be-
cause most women who sought abortions did not fit within the
statutory categories." The relatively easy access to abortions in
New York, the only "repeal" state with no residency require-
ment,20 merely exacerbated the differential treatment accorded
affluent women who could travel and poor women who could
not.2'
Both the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,22 declaring the state's ban on contraceptives unconstitutional
as an invasion of privacy, and former Supreme Court Justice
Clark's article urging abortion reform 23 indicated that the judicial
as well as the legislative branch might review the abortion laws.
18. In People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970), the California Supreme Court
gave a clear explanation of why the number of legal abortions did not increase
appreciably under California Penal Code section 274, a statute similar to the
Model Penal Code provision:
[N]o criminal penalties are imposed where the doctor refuses to perform
a necessary operation, even if the woman should in fact die because the
operation was not performed.
The pressures on a physician to decide not to perform an absolutely
necessary abortion are, under section 274 of the Penal Code, enormous
Id. at 973, 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (original emphasis). See also
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 214-15 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); YWCA
v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1066 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989
(1974); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 759 (N.D. Ohio 1970), where the
dissenting opinion speaks of the chilling effect of the criminal law on legal
abortions; State v. Munson (7th Jud. Cir. Ct. S.D. 1970), reported in 15 S.D.L.
REV. 332 (1970), rev'd, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated, 410 U.S.
950 (1973).
19. Even before the ALI statutes were passed, doctors estimated that only five
percent of the women seeking abortions could qualify for therapeutic abortions
(for maternal health). ABORTION: LEGAL AND ILLEGAL; A DIALOGUE BETWEEN
ATTORNEYS AND PSYCHIATRISTS 22-24 (J. Kummer ed. 1967). For a detailed ac-
count of the demise of the physical indications for therapeutic abortions, see Quay,
Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 173, 185-220
(1960); Guttmacher, The Shrinking Non-Psychiatric Indications for Therapeutic
Abortion, in THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 12-21 (H. Rosen ed. 1954, reissued 1967).
20. Alaska required thirty days residency; Hawaii and Washington required
ninety; see note 14 supra.
21. During the first fifteen months following passage of the New York stat-
ute, 65 percent of the abortions were performed on non-residents. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 1972, § L, at 61N, col. 4. Nearly half of the increase in legal
abortions between 1968 and 1972 is accounted for by New York state, where an
estimated 310,000 legal abortions were performed in 1972. About 60 per cent
of all women getting abortions in New York came from other states. The Popu-
lation Council, reported in Supreme Court Eases Rules on Abortion, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Feb. 5, 1973, at 36.
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
in which the Court held a Massachusetts law forbidding the distribution of contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons to be violative of equal protection and the right of
privacy.
23. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2
LOYOLA U. (L.A.) L. REv. 1 (1969).
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In 1969 the California Supreme Court became the first court to
strike down an abortion statute.24 In 1970 the United States Su-
preme Court denied certiorari to that case25 and dismissed an ap-
peal from a federal district court decision which, although declar-
ing the Wisconsin abortion statute unconstitutional, denied injunc-
tive relief against criminal prosecution thereunder.2"
In 1971 the Supreme Court held that the Washington, D.C.
abortion statute was not unconstitutionally vague since it had been
liberally construed by the District of Columbia courts.27 However,
the Court also hinted that the right of privacy might provide a
more efficacious ground than vagueness for attacking abortion
statutes.28  Notice was thus given that the Court might soon di:
rectly decide the constitutionality of restrictive abortion statutes.
The judiciary may always defer to legislative judgment,
a tack especially appropriate when dealing with a complex and
controversial issue like abortion; thus, the state and lower federal
courts were not compelled to enter the fray. Nevertheless, they
did. Increasing numbers of state and federal courts wrote de-
tailed opinions reaching the constitutional issues involved in abor-
tion statutes.
It is not clear exactly what practical considerations may
have encouraged the judicial branch to enter the thicket of abor-
tion reform rather than defer to the legislative branch. Some
judges may have been appalled by the results of such deference
by other courts: after a few legislatures had enacted very liberal
statutes, the courts' usual acceptance of legislative judgment re-
sulted in blatant inconsistencies between liberal and traditional
jurisdictions. For example, the Court of Appeals of New York29
upheld the legislature's decision to allow unrestricted abortions up
to the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy, while a federal district
court 9 in Ohio deferred to that state's legislature, which had pro-
scribed abortions even in rape cases.
24. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). This four-to-three decision was well docu-
mented and was frequently cited by other pro-abortion courts. At the time of
the decision the California statute had already been replaced by a modified ALI
statute.
25. California v. Belous, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
26. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400
U.S. 1 (1970).
27. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
28. Id. at 72-73.
29. Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887,
335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973). Due to inex-
pert use of the saline treatment and miscalculations of gestation period, there were
twenty-six "live" births reported under this New York statute. One fetus lived
and was eventually adopted. L. LADER, AnORTION II 165 (1973).
30. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 748 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
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Furthermore, some judges may have hoped that activism in
the lower courts would eventually force the Supreme Court to
reach a definitive position on the constitutionality of abortion stat-
utes. A few reform-minded judges, perceiving the increasingly
liberal trend in public opinion"1 but acknowledging the difficulty
of legislative reform, may have decided to face the question them-
selves rather than wait for legislative action. Still other judges,
recognizing that post-coital and implantation-preventing contra-
ceptives 2 technically violated abortion statutes purporting to pro-
tect the fetus from the "moment" of conception, may have de-
cided to hasten the inevitable demise of these statutes. And
egalitarian judges may have been moved by the special privileges
afforded the more affluent and mobile women who were able to
procure safe abortions abroad or in the security of private medical
suites.
These considerations, however, are seldom mentioned in the
judicial opinions; they are never the ratio decidendi for invalidat-
ing abortion statutes. What then were the crucial factors con-
sidered by judges in reviewing the constitutionality of abortion
statutes? It is important to all litigators, legislators, and con-
cerned citizens to understand how judges responded to thor-
oughly researched and thoughtfully presented arguments about
such a significant moral, legal, and medical issue as abortion. It
is also important to know what changes in the world outside the
courtroom affected the judges who were being asked to change
the law, and particularly those judges who ultimately did decide
to change the law. Thus, there is a special significance to the
lower court opinions which came down prior to the ultimate Su-
preme Court decision in Roe.
This article is an attempt to elucidate how the American judi-
ciary responded to abortion, why it reached inconsistent and con-
tradictory conclusions on this admittedly controversial issue, and
what factors the courts relied upon in their opinions. In surveying
the forty most important abortion opinions preceding and includ-
ing Roe, this article will accord careful attention to both the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions3" in those decisions, for it is the ju-
31. See CALLAHAN, supra note 3, at 10-11; L. L&DER, ABORTION II 186-87
(1973); Rossi, Public Views on Abortion, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION
Now (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
32. See R.F.R. GARDNER, ABORTION: THE PERSONAL DILEMMA 263-67
(1972); Guttmacher, The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in New York: A Per-
sonal Insight, in ABORTION, SOCIETY AND THE LAW 63, 76-80 (D. Walbert & J.
Butler eds. 1973); Note, Criminal Law-Abortion-The "Morning-After Pill" and
Other Pre-Implantation Birth Control Methods and the Law, 46 ORE. L. REV. 211
(1967).
33. For convenience and brevity, the term "pro-abortion" will be used to refer
to opinions (whether majority or dissent) which imply or assert a right to choose
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dicial reasoning, not the view that eventually prevailed in Roe,
which is the subject of our examination. This survey will reveal
what changes in modem society judges could have acknowledged
but did not, as well as the advancements in medicine they gladly
acknowledged. The reasons for this judicial recognition and non-
recognition will also become apparent. The article concludes with
a criticism of judicial reliance on science, medicine, and statistics
in deciding multifaceted moral issues.
I. SOME OVERT JUDICIAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Nineteenth Century Abortion Statutes
Modern courts called upon to review abortion statutes have
usually found themselves dealing with century-old legislation. As
interpreters of the law, the courts necessarily must consider the
language of these statutes, the legislative history, and legislative
intent. Abortion statutes themselves are a fascinating subject be-
yond the scope of this article, but perhaps the following general-
izations will suffice to characterize their Victorian origins. Despite
the paucity of recorded debate and legislative history, most writers
agree that the main impetus for the 19th century legislation
was concern for the life and health of the woman. 4 Any internal
surgery was risky, and childbirth was clearly safer than abortion.
In his well-documented article, Professor Cyril Means argued that
the legislators did not seek to implement any moral or religious
concern for the fetus.85  Daniel Callahan, however, has echoed
the contention of many that the "implicit cultural purpose [of the
statutes] was primarily that of embodying the Judeo-Christian
belief in the right of life and the necessity of preserving human
life. ' '3 6 Other authors and some judges, have inferred other pur-
to abort, that is, those opinions which strike down restrictive abortion statutes and
which uphold the very liberal "repeal" statutes. "Anti-abortion" refers to the
opinions which uphold restrictive statutes.
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148, 151 (1973). For a detailed history and
analysis of the genesis of American abortion laws, particularly the New York stat-
ute, see Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of
the Fetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Means]. For a study of the common law see Means,
The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right
About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth
Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971). For an argument
against Means' thesis and a criticism of the Supreme Court for relying on Means'
research, see Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FoRDHAm L. REV. 807 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Byrn].
35. Means, supra note 34, at 463.
36. CALLAHAN, supra note 3, at 126. See also Bym, supra note 101, at 833:
"[A] major purpose was the protection of unborn children without regard to age."
In case law, see, e.g., People v. Nixon, 42 Mich. App. 332, 349, 201 N.W.2d 635,
644 (1972) (Burns, J., dissenting in part), rev'd, 50 Mich. App. 38, 212 N.W.2d
797 (1973).
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poses in anti-abortion legislation, such as the propagation of the
race (the need for population),3" and the policing of morals (de-
terrence of extramarital sex and nonprocreative marital sex). 8
Many of the original statutes were amended to increase the
penalties and to eliminate the requirement that the fetus be
"quick" 9 before abortion could be proscribed. Thus, even abor-
tion performed in early pregnancy became illegal. Most of the
statutes carried into the twentieth century their Victorian language
and form. They made it a crime to perform an abortion, unless
done by a physician in order to save the life of the mother. Un-
fortunately for the courts which undertook to interpret them, most
of these statutes contained few details about their purpose. As
a result, it was unclear where the burden of proof lay, who could
be prosecuted, and, most importantly, who was the victim of the
crime-the mother or the fetus.
This statutory ambiguity as to purpose allowed considerable
judicial leeway for interpretation. Two generalizations emerge
from a careful reading of recent abortion opinions:4" (1) the
judges wrote very confidently that their particular statutory inter-
pretation was the only reasonable one, and (2) the interpretations
were strained--even tortured.
A few examples will clarify these generalizations. A Ver-
37. See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 243 P.2d 532, 536-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952),
rev'd, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953).
38. See, e.g., Tippie v. State, 89 Ohio St. 35, 40, 105 N.E. 75, 77 (1913):
The reason and policy of the [Ohio abortion] statute is to protect
women and unborn babes from dangerous criminal practice, and to dis-
courage secret immorality between the sexes, and a vicious and craven
custom amongst married pairs who wish to evade the responsibilities and
burdens of rearing offspring.
This case involved the conviction of a doctor who administered chloroform as an
anesthetic so that he could conduct an internal examination on a woman who had
attempted to abort herself and who might have been carrying a dead fetus. Al-
though the doctor decided that the fetus was alive and did not perform the abor-
tion, the mother died from effects of the chloroform.
But see Means, supra note 34, in which the author found no evidence of the
original legislatures' intent to protect the morals of the mother. However, non-
procreative sexual activities were such an anathema that Connecticut banned the
use of contraceptives in 1879, as Massachusetts had earlier. In striking down the
statute in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the state counsel's view that the purpose of the statute was to inhibit only
illicit sex. But another rationale for the statute was that "the artificial limitation
of even legitimate childbearing would be inimical to the public welfare.
State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 424, 11 A.2d 856, 861 (1940).
39. According to Stedman's Medical Dictionary, quickening is the point at
which the fetus indicates signs of life by way of fetal movements which can be
felt by the mother, usually occurring during the fourth or fifth month of preg-
nancy. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1340 (22nd ed. 1970).
40. Detailed consideration of the statutes initially arose in response to attacks
on the vagueness of the statutory language and criteria. But the case law reveals
a gradual shift of judicial attention to the question of whether the statutes were
intended to protect the fetus or the mother.
[Vol. 15
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mont court noted that the abortion statute under attack specified
that the woman could not be prosecuted. 4 The court read this
as retaining for the woman her common law right to abort an un-
quickened fetus, but most courts would probably have read the
specific provision as indicating simply that the woman was to be
treated as the victim of the crime,42 not the accomplice. Or they
would have interpreted the provision as an aid to prosecution: it
would be difficult for the prosecutor to get the woman to testify
against the abortionist if in so doing she were to incriminate her-
self and risk her own prosecution.43
In another case, a pro-abortion judge44 noted that the statute
under review referred only to an "embryo or fetus," not to a
"child" or "human being" or "human being from the time of con-
ception until it is born alive. ' 45  He took this as one sign that the
legislature had not proposed to protect fetal life. The anti-abor-
tion majority in the same case reached the opposite conclusion,
finding that the words "embryo" or "fetus" indicated that the state
intended to protect life from approximately the first week follow-
ing conception, that is, from the moment that doctors would begin
using the term "embryo" to describe the growing organism. 46
Another pro-abortion judge noticed the word "vitalized" used
to modify "embryo or fetus" in the abortion statute under
review.4 7  Referring to Webster's Third International Dictionary
for the meaning of "vitalized," he decided that it referred to the
41. Beecham v. Leahy, 130 Vt. 164, 287 A.2d 836 (1972).
42. See, e.g., People v. Nixon, 42 Mich. App. 332, 337 & n.9, 201 N.W.2d
635, 639 & n.9 (1972); rev'd, 50 Mich. App. 38; Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Medical
Exam'rs, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1242 (E.D. La. 1970) (dissenting opinion), vacated,
412 U.S. 902 (1973). See also Byrn, supra note 34, at 854-55.
Even a very early opinion about the evidentiary relevance of the woman's tes-
timony stated that she was not to be considered as an accomplice. State v. Carey,
76 Conn. 342, 56 A. 632 (1904). A recent pro-abortion decision, Abele v. Mar-
de, 342 F. Supp. 800, 807-08 (D. Conn. 1972) (concurring opinion), vacated, 410
U.S. 951 (1973), cited Carey as support for the propositions that the woman, not
the fetus, was the victim, and that the statute was generally intended to protect
the woman's health. The statutes being interpreted in those two cases did not
specify whether the woman could be prosecuted.
43. See, e.g., People v. Nixon, 42 Mich. App. 332, 350, 201 N.W.2d 635, 646(1972) (concurring and dissenting opinion), rev'd, 50 Mich. App. 38, 212 N.W.2d
797 (1973). But see George, The Evolving Law of Abortion, 23 CAsE W. Ras.
L. REv. 708, 723-24 (1972), for statutory provisions which render women sus-
ceptible to prosecution but which may also have the effect of aiding prosecution,
since the prosecutor can grant the woman immunity in exchange for her testi-
mony. See also ABORTION: LEGAL AND ILLEGAL; A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ATrOR-
NEYS AND PSYCHIATRISTS 6 (J. Kummer ed. 1967).
44. For the terminology, "pro-abortion judge," see note 33 supra.
45. Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1239
(E.D. La. 1970) (dissenting opinion), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
46. Id. at 1225.
47. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 754 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (dissenting
opinion).
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viability of the fetus48 rather than to its quickening.4 9 He then
overlooked the possible relevance of the fact that the entire phrase
"vitalized embryo or fetus at any stage of utero-gestation,"50 had
been eliminated in a subsequent amendment."
As noted above, 2 the quickening distinction was often elimi-
nated from the original statutes. Pro-abortion opinions inter-
preted this fact as an indication of the legislature's concern for the
health of the mother.5" Anti-abortion opinions interpreted it as
concern for the fetus from the moment of conception. 4 Again
the legislative history does not illuminate the issue."
The reason these various judicial interpretations of the unar-
ticulated legislative intent seem strained and contradictory may
have been that they were used as mere rationales for the desired
results rather than as reasoned bases for determining the outcome.
In other words, the judges may have decided the cases on ethical
grounds and then forced the statutes to support their positions.
B. Prosecutorial Paralysis
When the courts looked to the executive branch for guidance
on abortion, to supplement the ambiguous message from the legis-
lature, the confusion increased. Violations of criminal abortions
laws abounded, but prosecutions were few. Doctors who were
known to have performed tens of thousands of abortions were sel-
dom if ever prosecuted, as some pro-abortion opinions have em-
phasized.5 6 Occasionally, the courts reasoned that because the
woman could not be prosecuted under the statute, she has the
right to choose abortion.5 7  Or they pointed out that in practice
48. In Roe, the Supreme Court spoke of viability as the point when the fetus
is potentially able to live outside the womb, albeit with artificial aid. This point
is commonly "placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier,
even at 24 weeks." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (footnote omitted).
49. See note 39 supra.
50. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 751, 754 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (dissenting
opinion).
51. The amended statute in question, Omo REv. STATS. § 2901.16 (1953),
merely addressed itself to the procurement of miscarriages.
52. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
53. See, e.g., Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
54. See LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 567, 100 N.W.2d 445, 450 (1960).
55. One pro-abortion opinion concluded that the reason for the elimination
of the quickening distinction "could as easily have been more comprehensive pro-
tection of all mothers as of all fetuses." Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 807
(D. Conn. 1972) (concurring opinion), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
56. See L. LADER, ABORTION II 4-5, 102-03 (1973). The few prosecutions
which do occur seem to be motivated by a desire for publicity. See NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 3, 1975, at 23.
57. See, e.g., People v. Nixon, 42 Mich. App. 332, 340, 201 N.W.2d 63.5, 641
(1972), rev'd, 50 Mich. App. 38, 212 N.W.2d 797 (1973). Lader reports that
Shirley Ann Wheeler became the first woman in America known to be held crim-
inally liable for an abortion. Florida v. Wheeler, Felony Court of Record, Volu-
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women rarely were prosecuted. But more often the pro-abortion
opinions emphasized the fact that the pattern of prosecution
showed no concern for the fetus.5" Sometimes they noted that
the large-scale non-compliance with abortion laws by women indi-
cated public disapproval of the strict statutes.59
The Supreme Court has said that the repeated failure to pros-
ecute an anti-contraceptive law virtually nullified the statute and
made the issue non-justiciable:
[N]o prosecutions are recorded . . . . The undeviating
policy of nullification by Connecticut of its anti-contraceptive
laws throughout all the long years that they have been on the
statute books bespeaks more than prosecutorial paralysis. 60
Those anti-abortion opinions which mentioned prosecutorial pa-
ralysis did so only to facilitate deciding the threshold questions of
standing, abstention, and appropriateness of injunctive relief. 61
But in reaching the merits of the case, concerning declaratory re-
lief on constitutional issues, they simply did not mention the pa-
ralysis or pattern of prosecution. Oddly enough, only a few of
the pro-abortion opinions mentioned this executive restraint,62
perhaps because the courts were hesitant to imply that the judicial
branch would strike down acts of the legislative branch which the
executive branch either did not enforce at all or enforced only se-
lectively and erratically. Such an implication, in the minds of
many judges, would constitute judicial impingement on the legisla-
tive province.
In Roe v. Wade, 63 the Supreme Court did not mention the
pattern of prosecution of abortion offenses. The only clue regard-
ing a pattern came in a reference to the dangerous and illegal
"abortion mills." Instead of criticizing the state for failing to
prosecute, the Court in effect reprimanded all the states for
forcing women to resort to illegal and unsafe means of abortion:
The prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal "abortion
mills" strengthens, rather than weakens, the State's interest in
sia Cty., F., No. 1400 (1971), cited in L. LADER, ABORTION II 188-89 (1973).
She was put on probation.
58. See, e.g., Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 318 F. Supp. 1217,
1241-42 (E.D. La. 1970) (dissenting opinion), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
59. See, e.g., State v. Munson (7th Jud. Cir. Ct. S.D. 1970), reported in 15
S.D.L. REv. 332 (1970), rev'd, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated,
410 U.S. 950 (1973).
60. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502 (1960).
61. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 744 (N.D. Ohio 1970),
where the parties stipulated that no physician had ever been prosecuted in the rele-
vant geographic area.
62. See cases cited in notes 58 & 59 supra.
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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regulating -the conditions under which abortions are per-
formed.64
In short, the attempted judicial synthesis of the input from
the other two branches of the government resulted in confusion,
for it was difficult to reconcile the meaning of the strict laws from
the nineteenth century (the old message from the legislative
branch), the failure to enforce them (the consistent message from
the executive branch), and the failure to repeal them (the new
message from the legislative branch).
C. Legislative Failure to Repeal
Failure to repeal"5 was most often cited in the anti-abortion
opinions 6 to indicate that the legislators had openly debated the
question about fetal life and decided to protect it. Thus, even
if protection of the fetus had not been the primary purpose of the
original statutes, it became the primary purpose when the legisla-
tures implicitly re-enacted these statutes by failing to repeal
them. 67
The pro-abortion decisions usually ignored this alleged "re-
enactment by acquiescence." There are, of course, practical
64. Id. at 150.
65. There were a very few cases challenging the four "repeal" statutes. See
note 14 supra for a list of the statutes. The major case is Byrn v. N.Y. City
Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390
(1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973). There were a few cases challeng-
ing liberalized ALI statutes which had been passed in more than a dozen states.
See, e.g., People v. Barkdale, 18 Cal. App. 3d 813, 96 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971),
vacated, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 503 P.2d 257, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972); People v. Pette-
grew, 18 Cal. App. 3d 760, 96 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1971), vacated, 8 Cal. 3d 347,
503 P.2d 276, 105 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1972).
But most of the cases involved the traditional, strict life-of-the-mother stat-
utes; hence this article focuses on the lack of repeal or substantial reform despite
recent pressure on the legislatures.
66. See, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 812 (D. Conn. 1972) (dis-
senting opinion), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Crossen v. Attorney Gen. of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 344 F. Supp. 587, 593 (E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated,
410 U.S. 950 (1973). But if the re-enactment occurred before the emergence of
right-to-life pressure groups, courts have felt more confident about holding the leg-
islature to what was probably the major purpose behind the statute in the nine-
teenth century-the woman's health. For example, the court in People v. Nixon,
42 Mich. App. 332, 201 N.W.2d 635 (1972), rev'd, 50 Mich. App. 38, 212 N.W.2d
797 (1973), purported to defer to the legislature but interpreted the statute as a
health measure which was unconstitutional when applied to a physician:
[We find nothing to indicate that the intent of the Legislature in 1931
was any different than that of the Legislature in 1846 [to protect the
pregnant woman].
[We need not, and most emphatically do not, express any opinion
as to whether the woman's "right of privacy" precludes any state action
with regard to abortion if the Legislature chooses to recognize the un-
quickened fetus as a new and separate human being.
Id. at 338, 344, 201 N.W.2d at 639, 643.
67. For further discussion of the debate see text accompanying note 79 nfmra.
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reasons to explain "re-enactment": the repeal of laws relating to
sexual morals is a risky undertaking; some legislators may vote
against repeal more to save their own careers than to save the
fetus; and anti-abortion lobbying is intense. At least one pro-
abortion judge concluded from this practical reality of legislative
paralysis that the courts must act, as they had done in striking
down anti-contraceptive laws.68 Another judge spoke more dis-
criminately of the technical distinctions between re-enactment and
mere failure to reform or repeal. He remarked that some affirma-
tive intention by the legislature is necessary when the laws intrude
on constitutional rights:
Such an approach is especially appropriate here, where a pur-
pose [health of the mother] that the legislature clearly was
advancing was sufficient to support the legislation when en-
acted, but has been rendered insufficient by subsequent fac-
tual developments in medicine. In such circumstances, for
a court to keep legislation in force by attributing to a legis-
lature a purpose [protection of the fetus] that the [19th
century] legislature most likely did not have is only a
subtle but nonetheless substantial usurpation of the legislative
function. Such a course would be based on the totally unreal-
istic assumption that, as to politically sensitive public issues,
failure to repeal is the equivalent of a decision to enact.69
But the anti-abortion dissent in the same case pointed out that
protection of fetal life was the major factor in the legislature's
repeated refusal to amend the statute. 70
Whether the legislature can change its intention or its priori-
ties concerning abortion without changing the statute is a fascinat-
ing and difficult question. The original purpose of the abortion
statutes was primarily the protection of the mother's health.71 But
medical statistics have established conclusively that childbirth is
now more dangerous than an abortion performed by competent
medical personnel during the first trimester.72 And modem
psychiatry has explained, though not conclusively, that abortion
can often be psychologically less damaging to the mental health
of the mother than delivery of an unwanted baby. 73 Furthermore,
68. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 759 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (dissenting
opinion).
69. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 811 n.18 (D. Conn. 1972) (concur-
ring opinion), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
70. Id. at 816 n.6 (dissenting opinion).
71. But see text accompanying notes 34-39 supra for some conflicting inter-
pretations of the original purposes.
72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); People v. Belous, 71 Cal.
2d 954, 965 & n.7, 458 P.2d 194, 201 & n.7, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 361 & n.7 (1969).
But see Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 744 (N.D. Ohio 1970), for a case
that refers to contradictory statistical evidence offered to a court.
73. See ABORTION: LEGAL AND ILLEGAL; A DIALOGUE BETwEa, ATarouRNYi
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modem women are not so easily deterred from procuring abor-
tions as were their 19th century counterparts. Because, in most
instances, illegal abortions are much more dangerous than legal
ones, the problem is dramatically posed: modem abortion is
dangerous to maternal health only because the law makes abortion
illegal. The law to protect health becomes the very cause of ill
health.
Even granting that one purpose (whether recent or original)
of the statutes was to protect fetal life, the dual purpose of the
statutes was internally inconsistent: the protection of the mother's
health could not be achieved without defeating the purpose of pro-
tecting fetal life. It is difficult to imagine how the courts could
settle the problem without some constitutional right to tip the
balance in favor of either the mother or the fetus. As will be
explained, the balance has usually been decided on moral
grounds, although explained on other grounds.
The pro-abortion courts recognized the existence of such a
constitutional issue and resolved it in favor of the mother. Thus,
even if one statutory purpose was the protection of the fetus,
under the pro-abortion position, the state is forbidden to carry out
that purpose to the fullest. This has become the Supreme
Court's position.74  The High Court75  and other pro-abortion
courts7 6 have also ruled that the fetus is not a person or citizen
as contemplated by the fourteenth amendment and hence cannot
be protected against a hospital's decision to perform otherwise
legal abortions.
D. The Debate About Fetal Life
In assessing legislative intent, judicial opinions on abortion
occasionally referred to the debate over the value of fetal life.
7
This debate also rages throughout society. Popular literature
today is filled with photographs tracing fetal development and
AND PSYCHrATRISTS 18-19 (J. Kummer ed. 1967); Schwartz, Abortion on Request:
The Psychiatric Implications, in ABORTION, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 139 (D. Wal-
bert & J. Butler eds. 1973); Fleok, A Psychiatrist's Views on Abortion, in ABOR-
TION, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 179, 182-83 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973) and
sources cited therein. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See gen-
erally YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
989 (1974). But see R. GARDNER, ABORTION: THiE PERSONAL DILEMMA 203
(1972); Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J.
173, 227 (1960); Dunbar, A Psychosomatic Approach to Abortion and the Abor-
tion Habit, in ABORTION IN AMERICA (H. Rosen ed. 1967).
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
75. Id. at 157.
76. E.g., McGarvey v. Magee-Women's Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751, 754 (W.D.
Pa. 1972).
77. See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
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commentaries speculating about the moral, religious, medical, and
legal significances of each stage. Widespread discussion has pro-
duced little consensus about when human life begins. People
who never previously thought about when "humanness" begins.
find themselves signing petitions, answering opinion polls, carrying
"Abortion is Murder" placards, testifying before legislative com-
mittees that an embryo is just protoplasm, or trying to react
rationally to a six-month-old fetus in a jar carried by a middle-
aged man into a ladies' luncheon meeting.
The openness and pervasiveness of the contemporary dis-
agreement over the point at which life begins mark an alteration
in the social milieu surrounding the abortion question. That such
a question is the subject of open and heated discussion reflects
a dramatic change from the Victorian reticence about delicate con-
ditions and sensitive subjects. But more importantly, the contro-
versy means that many people and groups are making overt com-
mitments about the value of fetal life; these commitments are then
incorporated into the legal arguments presented to the judiciary.
It is instructive to note whether judges discuss the abor-
tion debate in their opinions and especially whether they recognize
its modem origins, unrelated to the 19th century social con-
text in which the statutes emerged. And if the dispute is judicially
recognized as reflecting a change in public sensibility, it is worth
analyzing the ramifications this shift is considered to have for the
constitutionality of the statutes being challenged. A survey of the
abortion opinions reveals that although most judges do discuss the
debate,78 most of them do not discuss it as a change.
1. The debate carried to the courts. Some anti-abortion
judges seemed to ignore the controversy, 79 which perhaps weak-
ened their position that the state could and should protect life
from the moment of conception. One judge has said simply:
Once human life has commenced, the constitutional protec-
tions found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose
upon the state the duty of safeguarding it.sO
Frequently, the anti-abortion decisions turned the differ-
ences of opinion on the subject into an argument against liberal-
ized abortion. Dissenting in Roe, Justice Rehnquist said that the
existence of the controversy undermined the claim to the firm es-
78. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
79. But see text accompanying notes 124-26 supra, suggesting that the debate
in the legislature helped confirm that legislative intent shifted to protecting fetal
life.
80. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746-47 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (empha-
sis in original).
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tablishment of the woman's right to choose, that the debate indi-
cated there was no fundamental right to an abortion, and that such
a right was not "rooted in the traditions. . . of our people."81
Usually the debate was treated as the sign of a policy issue,
which should be left to the legislature. As one federal district
court noted,
[w]hen distinctively human life begins is a matter about
which reasonable, fair-minded men are in basic disagree-
ment.8
2
The court went on to hold:
[T]he State of Louisiana was empowered to place a value
upon prenatal human life and . . . the valuation manifested
by the Louisiana abortion statutes may not be struck down
by this Court.83
In upholding an ALI-based statute, a federal court in North
Carolina stated that the assessment of fetal rights and the balanc-
ing of these rights against those of the mother are "value judg-
ment[s] not committed to the discretion of judges but reposing
instead in the representative branch of government."8 4 This same
theme continues throughout other anti-abortion opinions, 5 includ-
ing Justice White's dissent in Doe v. Bolton:
In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over
which reasonable men may easily and heatedly differ, I can-
not accept the Court's exercise of its clear power of choice by
interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect
human life and by investing mothers and doctors with the con-
stitutionally protected right to exterminate it. This issue, for
the most part, should be left with the people and to the
political processes the people have devised to govern their af-
fairs.86
It is difficult to discern whether the anti-abortion courts
81. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority
sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least
a century is a strong indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right
to an abortion is not "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Even today, when society's views on abortion are
changing, the very existence of the debate is evidence that the "right"
to an abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellants would
have us believe.
82. Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (E.D.
La. 1970), vacated, 412 U.S. 906 (1973), also quoted in Corkey v. Edwards, 322
F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
83. 318 F. Supp. at 1228.
84. Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated,
410 U.S. 950 (1973).
85. See, e.g., Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1395-96 (N.D. I11. 1971)(Campbell, J., dissenting), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
86. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, I., dissenting).
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deferred to the legislature from a true appreciation of separation
of powers, from a sense that the legislature was correct, or from
a desire to avoid a controversial issue. Occasionally an opinion
would mildly chastise the legislature by saying that a better
balance could have been struck, 7 but the legislative province was
never questioned.
The anti-abortion opinions commonly seasoned the court's
deference to the legislature with right-to-life sentiments of their
own.88  Consider, for example, the following revelations about
fetal development:
Eleven years ago while giving an anesthetic for a ruptured
ectopic pregnancy (at two months gestation) I was handed
what I believed was the smallest living human being ever
seen. The embryo sac was intact and transparent. Within
the sac was a tiny (approx. 1 cm.) human male swimming
extremely vigorously in the amniotic fluid, while attached to
the wall by the umbilical cord. This tiny human was per-
fectly developed, with long, tapering fingers, feet and toes.
It was almost transparent as regards the skin, and the deli-
cate arteries and veins were prominent to the ends of the fin-
gers.
The baby was extremely alive and swam about the sac
approximately one time per second, with a natural swimmer's
stroke. This tiny human did not look at all like the photos
and drawings and models of "embryos" which I have seen,
nor did it look like a few embryos I have been able to ob-
serve since then, obviously because this one was alive!
...When the sac was opened, the tiny human immedi-
ately lost its life and took on the appearance of what is
accepted as the appearance of an embryo at this age (blunt
extremities, etc.).
It is my opinion that if the lawmakers and people real-
ized that very vigorous life is present, it is possible that abor-
tion would be found much more objectionable than euthana-
sia.89
One judge related this story to supplement the "well-known
states of fetal development," and then concluded from this and
other considerations that "the undisputed medical facts of record
87. See, e4g., Crossen v. Attorney Gen. of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
344 F. Supp. 587, 591 (E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
88. See, e.g., Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 213,
286 N.E.2d 887, 896, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 403 (1972) (Scileppi, J., dissenting), ap-
peal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
89. Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5,
8-9 (1970), quoting a story told by Paul E. Rockwell, M.D., Director of Anes-
thesiology at Leonard Hospital in Troy, New York, in Albany Times Union, Mai.
10, 1970, at 17, col. 3.
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herein establish sufficient state interest in the preservation of life
to support [the statute]." 90
To be contrasted with these anti-abortion opinions are those
decisions which upheld the woman's right to an abortion by using
the debate over fetal life to reach an entirely different result.
They began by firmly establishing the woman's constitutionally
protected right to decide whether to undergo an abortion. Given
this right, the state has the burden of proving that its impingement
on that right comports with due process of law.9 This shifting
of the burden of proof is in marked contrast with the approach
taken in most anti-abortion opinions, in which the woman's right
is not fully established as a premise.
The pro-abortion opinions then used the existence of the con-
troversy over the quality of fetal life to undermine the state's argu-
ment that human life was being protected against deprivation with-
out due process of law. These opinions acknowledged good faith
on all sides and purported to agree with anti-abortion opinions that
the
substantial questions of medical, philosophic and religious di-
mensions as to whether an embryo or fetus is a human being
from the moment of conception . . . [are] beyond the com-
petence of judicial resolution. 92
But the pro-abortion decisions did not leave these insoluble prob-
lems to the legislature. For the existence of the fetal life question
was used to bolster the woman's argument that abortions should
be allowed at least in the early months of pregnancy.
Accordingly, pro-abortion judges usually struck down the
whole statute as applied to the early months of pregnancy. 98
Some of these judges said that, given the irreconcilable nature of
the debate, a better balance must be struck between women's
rights and fetal rights.9 4 For example, in United States v.
90. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1394 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (dissenting opin-
ion), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
91. No opinion ever claims that the woman's right is absolute.92. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1074-75 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
93. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1072 (D.N.J. 1972) ("in its
early stages"); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D. Ill. 1971) ("at leastduring the first trimester"); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D.
Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970) ("four months or less"); People v.Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 415 (1970).
94. Anti-abortion opinions, on the other hand, do not reflect a belief that thefetus' right to life is subject to a balancing test. Two notable exceptions to this
generalization are Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971), va-
cated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973), and Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 318
F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
[Vol. 15
1975] MORAL SENTIMENT IN ABORTION OPINIONS 609
VuitchY5 District Judge Gesell wrote:
Matters have certainly reached a point where a sound, in-
formed interest of the state must affirmatively appear before
the state infringes unduly on [a woman's right to privacy]
... . But it does not appear to what extent Congress has
weighed these matters in establishing abortion policy for the
District of Columbia .... 96
Dissenting in the same case appealed to the Supreme Court,
Justice Douglas warned that because of the controversial nature
of abortion, juries might second-guess doctors as to when an abor-
tion was necessary for the preservation of a mother's life or health,
as specified in the statute.97
Taken all together, the pro-abortion opinions come close to
saying that no branch of government can settle the debate about
"life." In particular, the legislatures cannot infringe upon a
woman's fundamental right to an abortion by looking to only one
side of the debate about when life begins. The Supreme Court
made this clear in Roe:
In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one
theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant
woman that are at stake. 98
But the Court allowed the state to protect "potential life," that is,
the "viable"99 fetus, apparently believing that its own conceptuali-
zation of the beginning of "potential life" was more verifiable than
the legislature's conceptualization of the beginning of "life" or
"human life."
In summary, all of the abortion opinions consider in one way
or another the debate about life. While the anti-abortion opinions
generally defer to the legislature to settle the issue, the pro-abor-
tion decisions usually do not.
2. Deference to the legislature. Judicial attitudes toward
the legislative resolution of controversial issues depended on what
the particular state legislature had done. This legislative variable,
of course, only added to the divergence of legal rationales mar-
shaled to support abortion decisions. Pro-abortion judges facing
restrictive statutes hesitated to allow the legislature to give the
young fetus an unqualified right to life. On the other hand, anti-
abortion judges facing similar statutes were eager to let the legis-
lature grant the right. As we have seen, 100 these judges did not
95. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
96. 305 F. Supp. at 1035.
97. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing in part).
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
99. See note 48 supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 65-70 supra.
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
even require that the legislature be explicit about the right it was
bestowing.
Right-to-life advocates, however, should beware of depend-
ing on this judicial deference to the legislature to protect fetal life.
Consider, for example, the following quotation from Byrn v. New
York Health and Hospital Corp.:
Whether the law should accord legal personality [to a fetus]
is a policy question which in most instances devolves on the
Legislature.''
Mixed with some language about the sanctity of life, this quota-
tion could form the mainstay of an anti-abortion opinion. In fact,
the quotation comes from a pro-abortion opinion, upholding one
of the few very liberal statutes then in effect. 102 Judge Breitel
upheld the statute in Byrn, not by saying in precise terms that the
legislature should settle the debate about life,103 but by distin-
guishing the legal order from the natural order with its philosophi-
cal and religious notions of personhood:
It is not true, however, that the legal order necessarily corre-
sponds to the natural order. [citation omitted] That it should
or ought is a fair argument, but the argument does not
make its conclusions the law. It does not make it the law
anymore than that the law by recognizing a corporation or a
partnership as persons, or according property rights to uncon-
ceived children, make these "natural" nonentities facts in the
natural order.10 4
In a similar case, McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital,'
the court denied a petition by a guardian ad litem who sought to
enjoin abortions.
The narrow question is whether we will afford fetal life
constitutional protection. One need not be a strict construc-
tionist to answer this in the negative for to answer otherwise
would be to create a new administrative jungle in the name
of a civil right never heretofore conceived. . . . A decree
by a court that such process is required by virtue of the Four-
101. 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (1972)
(Breitel, J., majority opinion), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1972).
102. NEw YORK PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 1970).
103. Judge Breitel commented that the "real issues in this litigation . . . are
issues outside the law unless the Legislature should provide otherwise." 31 N.Y.
2d at 203, 286 N.E.2d at 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 394 (1972). It is not clear how
much "legal personality" this court would allow a legislature to confer on a fetus.
104. Id. at 201, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 393. Whichever side is
not supported by the present legislation sometimes appeals to "natural law."
Compare, e.g., Judge Burke's anti-abortion dissent in Byrn, id. at 208, 286 N.E.2d
at 893, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 399 with the pro-abortion argument offered by the appel-
lant in People v. Gallardo, 243 P.2d 532, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952), rev'd, 41
Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953), both advocating a return to "natural law."
105. 340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1972), alPd, 474 F.2d 1339 (1973).
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teenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act could not be justi-
fied. It would cause universal confusion and would be a
striking example of judicial legislation. 106
The court's practical approach stresses the administrative jungle
and other disastrous effects which would result were a court,
rather than a legislature, to grant rights to the fetus. 10 7
On the other hand, anti-abortion judges, facing a liberal
statute, have hesitated to allow the legislature to decide. As
Judge Scileppi wrote, dissenting in Byrn:
It is my firm moral and legal belief that life begins at
conception. . . . To conclude otherwise is to countenance
genocide and subject our population to what the [pro-abor-
tion] majority so casually categorizes as a legislative deter-
mination of policy.108
Another anti-abortion judge, dissenting in the same case, said that
abortion was not a mere policy decision to be left to the legislature.
He felt that the legislature had acted unconstitutionally and that
the roots of our law lie deeper than the Constitution itself, emanat-
ing from the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and natural
law. This judge feared the implications for the future of total
legislative freedom.
The rationale of the majority opinion admits that customs do
change and the Legislature could . . . do away with the old
folks and eliminate the great expense the aged are to tax-
payers. 109
The deeper disease in this legislation is the widening gap
between the American self-image of a country that values hu-
man life and the reality of a growing preoccupation of the
hedonists with a competitive drive for La Dolce Vita."0
All of these opinions illustrate the confusion and futility of
a court's attempt to avoid involving itself in the debate about life
by deferring to the legislature. Instead of trying to decide
whether the legislature really considered fetal rights when it ori-
ginally enacted an abortion statute, or when it later reconsidered
106. Id. at 754.
107. One wonders whether there would be any less confusion if the fetus were
indeed granted civil rights by the legislature or perhaps by a constitutional amend-
ment, for it is difficult to decide who should confer this right to life, if it is to
be conferred at all.
108. Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 213, 286 N.E.
2d 887, 896, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 403 (1972) (Scileppi, J., dissenting), appeal dis-
missed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
. 109. Id. at 208, 286 N.E.2d at 893, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (Burke, J., dissent-
ing), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
110. Id. at 211, 286 N.E.2d at 895, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (emphasis in origi-
nal), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
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the statutory provisions, and instead of listening to the semantic
arguments for calling the thing in the womb a "zygote" or a "min-
iature human being,""' one federal court cut through the rhet-
oric:
For the purposes of this decision, we think it is sufficient to
conclude that the mother's interests are superior to that of an
unquickened embryo, whether the embryo is mere protoplasm
. ..or a human being .... 12
Like all judges, this one weighed various factors and decided in
favor of one side. Unlike most judges, however, he did not try
to offer an explicit rationale.
II. HYPOTHESIS: MORAL SENTIMENT IN THE
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Thus far this article has illustrated the pre-Roe courts incon-
sistent, strained, and result-oriented discussions of legislative
history, language and intent, and public debate, especially con-
cerning the rights of the fetus. The judges seldom clarified the
reasons why they did or did not defer to the legislature, why they
did or did not find that the legislature had changed its priorities
without changing the statute, or why they did not discuss the
debate as a factor absent from the 19th century abortion setting.
Hence, the true jurisprudential bases of these opinions remain a
mystery.
One suspects that the ratio decidendi lay in the judges'
assessments of contemporary moral sentiment. It seems quite un-
likely that courts would have struck down statutes in such a sensi-
tive, highly emotional area without explicit constitutional grounds,
decisive documentary evidence, a convincing line of precedents,
or significant support in community moral sentiment. More
specifically, it is unlikely that courts would have struck down abor-
tion statutes without believing their decisions to be in accord with
those contemporary moral sentiments and standards.
There are even some indications that the judges' individual
assessments of morality were the crucial difference between those
who upheld and those who struck down the restrictive abortion
statutes. One indication is the large proportion of split decisions,
with one or more strong dissenting opinions."'
111. For an anti-abortion opinion which did not respond to all the emotionally
connotative language, see Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (W.
D.N.C.), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1971): "Whatever the entity is, the state has
chosen to protect its very existence."
112. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed,
400 U.S. 1 (1970).
113. See, e.g., Bym v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286
N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973);
Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
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Community sentiment can be infused into judicial opinions
by evoking various doctrinal rubrics. Anti-abortion opinions
deferred to the legislature either as the best reflection of senti-
ment or as the only one of which courts could take notice. As
one court intoned, "[w]e cannot substitute public opinion and
sentiment for the affirmative pronouncements of the legislature
.... 114 The pro-abortion opinions used another doctrine
relating to community sentiment: to grant fourteenth amendment
constitutional protection to a right not enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, a court must label it "fundamental."'15' This label attaches
to those rights deemed to be "rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people." 116  (In Roe, Justice Blackmun used the
terminology "fundamental right" in referring to abortion, although
he studiously avoided finding it "rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people."1 7 )
Viewed objectively, the issues, evidence, and prior case law
surrounding abortion logically could cut either way-either for the
woman's right to liberty or for the fetus' right to life."18  Given
the present state of medicine, it is impossible to implement the
inconsistent goals of protecting fetal life and allowing the mother
to choose the safest medical procedures."' Thus the choice of
goals necessarily becomes a moral decision.
Writing both as a Christian and a gynecologist, R. F. R.
Gardner said that every participant in the argument starts from
his own moral vantage point.'2 0
The rights of the fetus, which form the starting point for
one argument, conflict with the maternal rights which formed
[sic] the starting point for the next. As each argument forms
a coherent unit, it is impossible to trim it to fit its neighbour,
without starting again from the beginning.' 21
114. State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 217, 235 So. 2d 568, 574 (1970).
115. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
116. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
117. See text accompanying notes 179-219 infra.
118. For example, the line of cases leading up through Griswold could be cited
on behalf of the mother's right to privacy or could be distinguished on the ground
that in pregnancy a new life has begun. See text accompanying notes 130-56 in.
fra.
119. In contrast to the Victorian experience, statistics now demonstrate that
an early abortion performed by a doctor is safer than childbirth, that is, that more
maternal deaths and health problems result from childbirth than from abortion.
For evidence that this shift in statistics occurred some time between 1900 and
1933, see Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 384-87
(1971). See also note 72 supra.
120. R GARDNER, ABORTION: Tum PERSONAL DILEMMA 15-16 (1972).
121. Id. at 15.
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It is difficult to imagine that a judge could successfully extricate
himself from the moral issues faced by other thoughtful partici-
pants in the abortion question. The pro- and anti-abortion opin-
ions probably split ultimately on the morality of refusing a woman
relief from an unwanted pregnancy. If the judge felt that a fetus
is a full human being or a legal person, he would not be moved
by the medical statistics indicating that abortion is safer than child-
birth; nor would he feel that it is immoral or unconstitutional to
make a woman undergo the relatively greater risks of completing
the pregnancy once it has begun.
If it is true that judges based their decisions on moral senti-
ment, this thesis has two corollaries: the pro-abortion opinions
(which declared restrictive statutes unconstitutional) are rooted in
the judges' assessment that moral sentiment has changed since the
19th century, when the statutes were enacted and presum-
ably were constitutional; the anti-abortion opinions, on the other
hand, are rooted in the judges' assessment that moral sentiment
regarding the unborn fetus has not changed.
A survey of opinions reveals that anti-abortion judges did not
discuss change;122 in their judgment, there was no change to ex-
plain. Instead they rested upon what they considered to be the
timeless verities of American and Western tradition. On the other
hand, one would expect the pro-abortion opinions to emphasize
the change in social and moral values. For example, these opin-
ions could emphasize either the rising status of women or the
moral acceptability of birth control. But, as the next two sections
of this article reveal, the pro-abortion judges hesitated to acknowl-
edge certain kinds of changes even while readily acknowledging
others.
A. Psychological Separation of Sex and Procreation
One important change that has occurred is the psychological
separation of sex from procreation. In the 19th and early
20th centuries, pregnancy was considered a likely, desirable,
and even divinely ordained12 result of sexual intercourse.124 In
122. See, e.g., Cheaney v. State, - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972), cert. de-
nied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
123. For indications that this argument is still used, see George, The Evolving
Law of Abortion, 23 CASE WES. R.L. REv. 708, 709 (1972).
124. See generally V. BULLOUGH, THE SUBORDINATE SEX (1973).
Most people were horrified that any woman would reject mother-
hood, although there was compassion for the spinster since it was gener-
ally believed that she lacked the opportunity to be married and become
a mother. Any distribution of contraceptive information or devices in
the nineteenth century was punishable by law, and a majority of medical
men believed that the practice of birth control harmed health. ...
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the normal married woman's life children were a blessing. They
were necessary workers on the family farm and in local industry,
and many died young and had to be replaced. Thus, a woman's
ability to bear children assured her that she was fulfilling a useful
function in society. 125 Since non-procreative sex was viewed with
disfavor, 126 the creation of children justified what might otherwise
have been considered wrongful or self-indulgent dalliance.2 7
And extra-marital sex subjected the woman to the appropriate
retribution of bearing an unwanted, illegitimate baby. 128
Today, however, sex is viewed as being separate from pro-
creation. 129  Contrary to former times, children today can be a
financial drain on many urban families, and world stability is
threatened by overpopulation. Through education, the health
advantages resulting from the proper spacing of children are better
understood. Safer and more convenient contraceptives have been
developed, and their use has become widespread. For various
reasons, then, people today can and do engage in sexual inter-
course without the slightest intention of creating new life.
In Griswold v. Connecticut'8 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,' the
Supreme Court implicitly recognized this changed perspective on
sex. In those cases, the Court established that the state cannot
interfere with the acquisition or use of contraceptives by either
Some writers even compared the obligations of women to bear children
with the duty of military service for men.
Id. at 311.
125. As recently as 1952, an appellate court in California pronounced that a
woman's role is to serve society:
The state is the paramount creation of man. It derives from the family.
The evolutionary processes by which it evolved afford no basis for dis-
count of the power and the obligation of the modem state to discipline,
preserve and perpetuate the race.
The classifications indicated relate substantially to a legitimate object,
to wit, to save the lives of incipient embryos or fully formed fetuses,
that is, to forward the propagation of the race.
People v. Gallardo, 243 P.2d 532, 535-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952), rev'd, 41 Cal.
2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953).
126. One judge considered it "vicious and craven" for married people to try
to "evade the responsibilities . . . of offspring." State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35,
40, 105 N.E. 75, 77 (1913).
127. V. BULLOUGH, THE SuBoRDiNATE SEx 324-25 (1973).
128. The subjugation and punishment syndrome in legislation against contra-
ceptives and abortion has been mentioned by several authors. See, e.g., CALLA-
HAN, supra note 3, at 126; L. LADERn, ABORTION II 35 (1973); Fleck, A Psychia-
trist's Views on Abortion, in ABORTION, SOCIETY, AND THE LAw 179, 181 (D. Wal-
bert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
129. See Willemsen, Sex and the School Teacher, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 839,
844 (1974).
130. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
131. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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married or unmarried people."3 2 Some judges writing abortion
opinions have expanded the Griswold holding:
The right to obtain contraceptives carries with it the private
right of the individual to decide when to use the devices, and
when he shall forego using them, and this in turn gives rise
to the private right to decide when an act of intercourse will
be carried out for the purpose of satisfying one's own emo-
tion [sic] and physical needs, and when it shall be done for
the purpose of reproduction. 133
While the separation of sex from reproduction in contempor-
ary America is relevant to whether women have a right to an abor-
tion, the critical question is whether this change has been recog-
nized by courts in assessing the validity of abortion statutes. In
upholding strict statutes, some opinions scarcely seemed to recog-
nize the change. Several anti-abortion opinions have distinctly
moral overtones, reminiscent of the 19th century:
It may seem cruel to a hedonist society that "those who dance
must pay the piper" .... If one gambles and loses, it is
neither statute nor constitution that determines the price, or
how it shall be paid. The result is not punishment, but
merely the quid pro quo.13 4
Some have been more circumspect:
In my view, a decision to engage in sexual intercourse neces-
sarily entails an acceptance of the consequences and must
take into account the possibility that another life may be
created.135
No opinion sustaining a strict abortion statute went so far as to
say that the state has a legitimate interest in using abortion statutes
to police promiscuity, but some judges, like those quoted above,
implicitly endorsed a statute's supposed purpose of stifling illicit
sex.
More often the anti-abortion judges professed approval of
contraception while finding abortion to be an unacceptable means
to that end.'1 6  Central to these decisions was the belief that
human life begins at conception and that the state has a right-
or even a duty-to protect that life. "[T]he preliminaries have
ended, and a new life has begun,"' 37 or as another court put it:
132. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
133. Cheaney v. State, - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265, 273-74 (1972) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
134. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 748 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
135. Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 214, 286 N.E.
2d '887, 897, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 404 (1972) (Scileppi, J., dissenting), appeal dis-
missed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
136. See, e.g., id. at 210, 286 N.E.2d at 894-95, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01
(Burke, J., dissenting).
137. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
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The basic distinction between a decision whether to bear chil-
dren which is made before conception and one which is made
after conception is that the first contemplates the creation of
a new human organism, but the latter contemplates the de-
struction of such an organism already created. 138
Under this view, the court cannot consider abortion as just another
form of contraception. Accordingly, Griswold has been construed
narrowly.1 9 Thus it has been said that there is a "fundamental
distinction . . . between prevention and destruction."'10 The
creation of a new life supersedes the otherwise legally cognizable
right of the woman to separate her sexual from her reproductive
activities.
In contrast, the pro-abortion opinions did not treat the deci-
sion to have sex as tantamount to a commitment to abide by the
results. As Justice Douglas said in Doe v. Bolton, "[t]he vicis-
situdes of life produce pregnancies which may be unwanted
. . . ,,,"4' implying that women do have the right to terminate un-
expected and undesired pregnancies.
Most pro-abortion opinions implied that the woman's right to
have sex without procreation meant that abortion is permissible
at least through the third month of pregnancy.'42 These decisions
considered early abortion as an alternate form of contraception.
The authors of these opinions read Griswold broadly,143 following
former Justice Clark's reasoning that, "[i]f an individual may
prevent conception, why can he [sic] not nullify that conception
when prevention has failed?""'
Some opinions were more verbose:
[T]he freedom to determine whether to bear a child and to
terminate a pregnancy in its early stages is so significantly re-
lated to the fundamental individual and family rights already
found to exist in the Constitution that it follows directly in
their channel and requires recognition. Whether a constitu-
tional right of privacy in this area is conceptualized as a
138. Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (E.D.
La. 1970), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
139. See, e.g., YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1078-79 (D.N.J. 1972)(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Corkey v. Edwards, 322
F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); State v.
Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 666-67, 201 N.W.2d 123, 125 (1972) (noting the trend),
vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
140. Cheaney v. Indiana, - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265, 269 (1972) (emphasis
in original), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
141. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (concurring opinion).
142. See cases cited in note 93 supra.
143. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 752 (N.D. Ohio 1970)
(dissenting opinion).
144. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2
LOYOLA U. (L.A.) L. Rav. 1, 9 (1969).
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family right, as in Griswold, as a personal and individual
right, or as deriving from both sources is of no significance
and applies equally to all women regardless of marital
status.1 4
5
Some were more succinct: "We cannot distinguish the interests
asserted by the plaintiffs [pregnant women seeking abortions] in
this case from those asserted in Griswold.' 146  Some even said the
right to an abortion is more elemental than the right to practice
contraception:
Indeed in some ways the right to have an abortion is even
more compelling than the rights involved in Griswold. Con-
traception involves the first line of defense against an un-
wanted birth; abortion the last. . . . At least two fundamen-
tal human rights are involved: the mother's autonomy over
her own body, and her right to choose whether to bring a
child into the world.147
In summary, the pro-abortion opinions implicitly recognized
that sex is separate from procreation and that abortion is a legiti-
mate means of maintaining that separation. Nevertheless, these
opinions did not mention the separation as a change of mores or
public opinion or medicine. Indeed, they did not discuss it as a
change at all. Once again, both pro- and anti-abortion courts
avoided any reliance on the new moral and social values reflected
in contemporary society.
B. The Rising Status of Women
Closely related to the separation of sex from procreation is
the change in social attitudes toward women that has taken place,
particularly in the last decade. The increasing variety of roles
available to women, the legal rights now accorded to them, the
rising expectations encouraged by the women's liberation move-
ment are all indicia of society's new moral sentiment and social
values. 4 "
An occasional opinion discussed this development as a
change. 49 The most explicit discussion occurred in Abele v.
Markle, a 1972 federal court decision:
145. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1072 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 989 (1974).
146. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S.
950 (1973).
147. Rosen v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 123.5 (E.D. La.
1970) (dissenting opinion), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
148. See generally W. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN (1972); J. HUBER,
CHANGING WOMEN IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (J. Huber ed. 1973); A. KRADITOR,
Up FROM TRE PEDESTAL (1968); W. O'NEILL, THE WOMAN MOVEMENT (1969);
A. SINCLAIR, THE EMANCIPATION OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN (1965).
149. There are indications in State v. Munson (7th Jud. Cir. Ct. S.D. 1970),
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In 1860, when 'these statutes were enacted in their present
form, women had few rights. Since then, however, their
status in our society has changed dramatically. From being
wholly excluded from political matters, they have secured full
access to the political arena. From the home, they have
moved into industry; now some 30 million women comprise
spect to permissible abortion in 1860 is not due process in
forty percent of the work force. And, as women's roles have
changed, so have societal attitudes. The recently passed
equal rights statute and the pending equal rights amendment
demonstrate that society now considers women the equal of
men.
The changed rule of women in society and the changed
attitudes toward them reflect the societal judgment that
women can competently order their own lives ....
The state interest in taking the determination not to have
children from the woman is, because of changing societal con-
ditions, far less substantial than it was at the time of the pas-
sage of the statutes ....
. ..What was considered to be due process with respect
to permissible abortion in 1860 is not due process in 1972.150
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton,
also hinted at the change in social attitudes toward women when
he said that to deny women the right to an abortion meant women
would have to give up education, present life styles, and ca-
reers.' 5 ' Surely no court in the 19th century would have
countenanced the argument that women should be allowed an
abortion to enable them to continue a life style or career outside
the home.
Most other opinions gave only the most paltry clue that any
change in attitudes had occurred. For example, the dissent in
Cheaney v. State said that "[b]y this statute, enacted in 1905, the
State has declared its absolute indifference to the basic liberty of
pregnant women. ' 152
The tone of many opinions was so pro-abortion as to suggest
that, had the courts been asked earlier to rule on the matter, they
would have said that the burden on pregnant women, especially
reported in 15 S.D.L. Rav. 332 (1970), rev'd, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123('1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973), and in Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp.
741, 759 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (dissenting opinion), that the psychological impact
of pregnancy and the change in the status of women were considered relevant.
150. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802-04 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated, 410
U.S. 951 (1973).
151. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 214-15 (1973).
152. Cheaney v. State, - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265, 274 (1972) (dissenting
opinion),* cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
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the psychological burden, would alone have been sufficient to
warrant some right to relief.'5 3  The following passage from the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Roe discusses in a typical
fashion the burden of unwanted pregnancies:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Speci-
fic and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early preg-
nancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon a woman a distressful life and future. Psy-
chological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. 154
Surely each of these generalizations about an unwanted pregnancy
could have been made in the 19th century or the earlier
part of this century.'55 Yet just as surely no 19th century
court would have spoken this way about the right to an abortion,
nor have reached the holding in Roe.
By the Court's own constitutional doctrines "fundamental
rights" can change over time.'56 Why, then, were courts hesitant
to acknowledge the change in women's status as relevant to the
declaration of a new fundamental right to abortion? There are
several possible reasons for this hesitancy.
(1) Many courts, including the Supreme Court, had never
explicitly upheld the constitutionality of abortion statutes. Be-
cause they were not reversing a former position, they did not need
to rely on a change in society to explain a change in law. They
could simply treat the issue of abortion as one of first impression
and conclude, given their proclivities, that, on first impression,
women deserve the right to a safe abortion.
(2) Some of the early pro-abortion decisions involved the
argument by doctors that the statutes were unconstitutionally
vague. Women's rights were a supporting policy argument rather
than the central argument; hence, there was little need for eluci-
153. See, e.g., Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1235
(E.D. La. 1970) (dissenting opinion), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
154. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
155. Of course, fewer pregnancies were unwanted then, since women tended
more willingly to accept their roles as mothers.
156. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669, rev'g Breed-
love v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (poll tax declared unconstitutional). Com-
pare the reversal of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), by Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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dation of the changes in the status of women when a modem case
was brought by physicians.
(3) A court could treat as dispositive of a case before it
the fact that modem abortions are relatively safe compared to
those in the 19th century and also safer than childbirth
today. 5 7  As long as these clear, medical developments could
justify a change in the legality of abortion, the pro-abortion courts
hesitated to rely upon amorphous social changes, such as the
separation of sex from procreation or the rising status of women.
(4) Courts familiar with the pre-statutory common law
realized that a pro-abortion decision only re-established a right
that existed before the Victorian period.158 Perhaps they were
therefore justified in not expounding on social changes. What-
ever the reasons, most pro-abortion opinions failed to discuss the
relevance of the change in the status of women to the issue of
abortion. 159
C. Changes in Medicine and Science
The Supreme Court ultimately decided in Roe that the state
had two legitimate interests regarding abortion: the health of the
mother and the potential life represented by the fetus.' In pur-
porting to further either or both of these interests, the state was
prevented from forbidding or regulating abortions during the first
trimester, because medical statistics on death rates confirm the
relatively greater safety of abortion compared to childbirth.' 6 '
Should these statistics suddenly change, however, the underpin-
ning of the Court's decision would collapse altogether. For the
statistics are the only reason for using the first trimester as the
outer perimeter of the state's interest in the mother's health.
157. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148-49 ('1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 216-17 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp.
800, 801 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). According to Profes-
sor Means, the statistics on the safety of abortions versus childbirth shifted to fa-
vor abortion some time between 1900 and 1933. Means, The Phoenix of Abor-
tional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth Amendment Right About to Rise from
the Nineteenth Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth Century Common Law
Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 384-87 (1971). If true, this fact supports the thesis
that recent judges' opinions were based more on the assessment of the present
moral climate than on pure medical "facts," for scientific evidence supporting
abortion has been available at least since the 1930's.
158. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-67 (1973).
159. But see Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802-04 (D. Conn. 1972), va-
cated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149-50, 162-63 (1973).
161. Id. at 149. Accord, YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 (D.N.J.
1972); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 801 n.6 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated,
410 U.S. 951 (1973); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 965-66, 458 P.2d 194,
200-01, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-61 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
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In pursuing its legitimate interest in the potential life of the
fetus, the state is restricted to the postviability stage16 2 as the outer
perimeter. Ostensibly the reason for this demarcation is that
viability marks the beginning of "meaningful life,"'' but the word
viability requires translation into a scientifically meaningful stand-
ard, presumably measured in weeks, which can then be incorpo-
rated into whatever regulations the state makes for the post-viabil-
ity period. The standard should correspond with scientific facts,
statistics, and medical techniques for saving premature babies. As
the court in Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.
noted:
Both those who attack the present statute and those who de-
fend it must and do rely ultimately on modern science and
particularly modern asepsis and techniques to mount their at-
tack or defend their positions.' 64
It is subject to question how secure the courts are in relying
on medicine or other sciences as the bases for their decisions and
how competent judges are to interrelate science and law. The
abortion decisions give some insights into these problems. What,
for instance, should judges conclude from the improvements in
contraceptives? The anti-abortion majority in Rosen v. Louisiana
Board of Medical Examiners seemed to say that contraceptives
rendered abortions unnecessary.' 65 Other judges have noticed
that the safest new contraceptives prevent implantation, not
conception, and have therefore concluded that the law could not
protect life from the moment of conception.' 6" As Justice Black-
mun said in Roe, new embryological data and new contraceptive
techniques such as menstrual extraction and the "morning-after"
pill created "substantial problems" for those who sought to protect
life from the "moment" of conception, given the fact that those
procedures destroyed fertilized ova. 167
Consider the difficulties faced by a judge (or legislator) in
trying to assimilate the meaning of expert testimony. The follow-
ing is an excerpt from the cross-examination of Dr. Christopher
Tietze, an expert medical witness, quoted in Rosen v. Louisiana
Board of Medical Examiners:
"Q. Dr. Tietze, I do not mean to keep quarreling with you
[I]s the embryo a human being in an earlier
state of development of the fetus?
162. See note 48 supra.
163. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
164. 311 N.Y.2d 194, 200, 286 N.E.2d 887, 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (1972),
appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
165. 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
166. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973).
167. Id. at 160-61 (1973).
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"A. If you will define, if your are referring, apparently to a
human being as something begotten by man and poten-
tially to become man, yes, it would be an early stage
of a human being ....
"Q. It is also fair to say that this zygote is an organism of
the same gene structure of a fully-grown, highly com-
plex adult?
"A. It has the same yes ....
"Q. Now, with regard to this zygote which is . . .an early
fetus, in biological terms, would it be not a fair state-
ment to say that this is human being?
"A. I think we are getting ourselves, now, into a philosophi-
cal question. I would say as a close approximation to
my own reaction to this thing-and that is what we all
must do, is face philosophical conceptions-that this is
a potential human being and 'I would not refer to the
zygote as an early embryo, I would refer to the zygote
as a potential embryo.
"Q. You injected the word philosophical, philosophy, and I
ask you from a biological standpoint, isn't this zygote,
this embryo, this fetus a human being?
"A. I think the term human being, with all of its conno-
tations, extends far beyond biology and is a philosophi-
cal concept. If you ask me whether the zygote nor-
mally in the course of circumstances, with exceptions,
will develop into a human being, obviously the answer
is yes. Whether this human being meets all of the
other qualifications that we attach to this important
term, I submit is not a question of biology. ... 168
The most ominous aspect of this colloquy is the combination
of the legal mind's eagerness to be in accord with science and its
desperate attempt to elicit from science a catch-word, almost a
magic incantation, which will automatically solve the legal prob-
lem. If the questioner could persuade the scientific expert to stop
saying "zygote" and start saying "human being," then the law
would know its course.
Cheaney v. Indiana"' provides another example of a "scien-
tific" solution to a multi-faceted problem. The majority anti-abor-
tion opinion cited advances in medical knowledge as the main
reason that courts had rejected the requirement that the fetus be
viable before the plaintiff could recover for prenatal injuries. 170
Then the court quoted favorably from tort opinions saying that
168. 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1236 nn.7 & 8 (E.D. La. 1970) (dissenting opinion),
vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
169. - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
170. Id. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 268.
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"legal separability should begin where there is biological separabil-
ity. . . . [S]eparability begins at conception.' "'7' The Cheaney
majority concluded that "biologically [viability] is merely an arbi-
trary distinction."' 72  Another court could just as easily have
decided that legal separability should occur when the baby is able
to survive separate from the mother or from any artificial support
systems.
Some judges have thought that
[s]uch terms as "quick" or "viable", which are frequently
encountered in legal discussion, are scientifically imprecise
and without recognized medical meaning, and hence irrele-
vant to the problem here presented. 173
Yet the common law considered the concept of quickening clear
enough for the law to use. And the Roe court considered the
point at which viability begins to be clear enough. One reason
for the latter view is that scientists tend to focus upon viability
rather than quickening.17  Hence if scientists think viability is a
significant stage of fetal development, then who are mere judges
to cavil about its appropriateness as a measuring device?
Most of the judges are inept in their attempts to be up-to-
date and scientifically sophisticated. And they are reproachable
for demeaning others for their ignorance of "true" scientific fact.
Many judges are obviously trying to escape the moral quandary
by clinging to something more definite than morality. Science ap-
pears to offer firm mooring in turbulent water.
The majority in Steinberg v. Brown said that legal practi-
tioners and pro-abortion judges should pay more attention to the
"laws of nature" and the "facts of biology." 75
The evidence . ..shows clearly, conclusively, and in
detail that neither the human ovum or spermatozoon are
alive, or capable of independent life, in the accepted meaning
of that word. 176
These judges ascertained the meaning of "life" from Webster's
Dictionary. 177  To determine when human life begins they con-
sulted Prosser and American Jurisprudence17S-for the proposi-
171. Id. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 269, quoting from Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App.
Div. 542, 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953).
172. - Ind. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 269.
173. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746 (N.D. Ohio 1970). Appar-
ently this judge felt that conception was more precise., id. at 747, although, asJustice Blac'kmun has pointed out, there is good evidence that conception is a proc-
ess, not a moment. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 11.3, 161 (1973).
174. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
175. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 747.
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tion that "human life commences at the moment of conception."
Such grasping at straws is neither law nor science. It certainly
is not the way to interrelate the two.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO
ABORTION: ROE V. WADE
Compared to the lower court pro-abortion opinions, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade179 was more narrowly
scientific, virtually barren of any discussion of social and moral
issues, and more surgically precise-almost cold-in its avoidance
of emotional issues and language.
The Court in Roe seemed reluctant to admit that it was mak-
ing moral decisions. More so than in other pro-abortion decisions,
the High Court "earnestly" sought to "resolve the issue by consti-
tutional measurement free of emotion and of predilection."'8s At
a few junctures in the decision the Court implicitly recognized that
attitudes on abortion have changed: "The Georgia statutes
[involved in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton]"' . . . are
a legislative product that . . . reflects the influences of recent
attitudinal change .... 99182 The Court hinted that it would
accord some significance to these attitudes:
[W]e have inquired into, and . . . place some emphasis
upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history
reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure
over the centuries.' 83
These lines are among the very few in which the Court mentioned
public attitudes or morality, or changes therein. Much time was
spent in Roe reviewing the history of abortion laws and procedures
throughout the ages. But in its selection of histories, the Court
revealed its unwillingness to examine the history of morals,
religious beliefs about abortion and the sanctity of life, debates
about the problem of overpopulation and unwanted children, or
economic or social issues-in short, anything that might involve
a value judgment.
The Court dealt with abortion as though morals or moral feel-
ing were not involved. The Court's recognition that abortion is
"like any other medical procedure"1 8 4 or "surgical procedure"'8 5
179. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), a compan-
ion case to Roe, the Court reviewed Georgia's liberal abortion statute and struck
down its requirements concerning hospital accreditation and staff approval of
abortions as unduly restrictive of the rights set forth in Roe.
180. 410 U.S. at 116.
181. See note 179 supra.
182. 410 U.S. at 116.
183. Id. at 116-17.
184. Id. at 150.
185. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197, 199 (1973).
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was not accompanied by a recognition of the moral implications
of abortion. According to the opinion, until the fetus is viable,
the decision whether to abort is to be made by the woman and
her doctor. More significantly, until the state interest in life
becomes compelling, "the abortion decision in all its aspects is
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision .... ")186
A. Judicial Rhetoric and the Roe Decision
Admittedly abortion is a medical procedure. But the ques-
tion remains why the Court in Roe insisted that it was a medical
decision. Perhaps the opinion was rhetorically designed to calm
the predictable excited reaction to the result it reached. The ad-
vocates of abortion on demand won more than they could have
expected. In the course of its opinion, it appeared the Court
attempted to mold public opinion, mollify the losing side, and
make a controversial outcome more palatable.
To this end, the Court fostered the aura of the concerned
physician in consultation with the pregnant woman, helping her
to understand all facets of her situation."" Justice ,Blackmun used
people's faith in doctors as a balm for broken faith in the law as a
bastion of morality. The "basic responsibility of [the abortion
decision] must rest with the physician."' 88  Justice wears a
starched white coat.
The Court's emphasis on health, well calculated to win public
approval, supplemented other public relations techniques. The
gratuitous historical references served to inform anti-abortion
advocates that history, even the history of the Catholic Church,
does not support the Church's present position.8 9 The Hippo-
cratic oath provisions against abortion were just the aberrant
beliefs of a small Greek sect. 190 Indeed, the common law
condoned abortion performed in early pregnancy. 19' In effect,
certain Christians seem to be the only deviants in the whole history
of abortion. And, of course, now that the American Bar Associa-
tion x92 and American Medical Association ° have finally concur-
red with the Public Health Association,19 4 there are very few
"deviants" left. The Court did not state the proposition that
186. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 153.
188. Id. at 166.
189. Id. at 133-34 & n.22, 160-61.
190. Id. at 130-32.
191. id. at 132-36.
192. Id. at 146-48.
193. Id. at 143-44.
194. Id. at 144-46.
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bluntly, but it did make clear that abortion was not the universally
condemned act which many opponents had believed it to be.
Another technique used by the Court involved giving the
winning side very little coverage. The woman's right to an abor-
tion was established succinctly on a mere two pages.'95 The im-
plication was that the right had been there all along, clearly deriv-
able from precedent. The Court gave no indication that it was
stretching the Constitution. 9 " After quickly asserting the wo-
man's right, the Court moved immediately to demonstrate that it
was not upholding the extreme claim that the right is absolute." 7
Under Roe the state seems to be allowed to carry out both
of the purposes it originally claimed, that is, the protection of both
maternal health and fetal life. The actual holding, however,
shows that the state has lost its major objectives. If the state is
not allowed to prevent abortion prior to viability, then essentially
it cannot prevent abortion at all, given the six-month period in
which the procedure is readily obtainable. Even after viability,
the Court would permit therapeutic abortion.'
In general, Justice Blackmun wrote a superficially persuasive
opinion which purported to balance the state interests against the
woman's interest, allowing the state some regulatory authority.
The elusiveness of the state's victory is not revealed until the end
of the opinion, by which time presumably the reader has been
convinced of the fundamental nature of the woman's right to abort.
The seductive quality of the opinion may make the result more
acceptable to the public.
Furthermore, in engaging in judicial legislation to the extent
that it did, the Court attempted to prevent future pro-abortion liti-
gation arising from statutes drafted to fill any vacuums or loop-
holes left by the Roe decision. The guidelines to the legislatures
are consistent with the Court's earlier declaration of an extensive
right.
Unless regulatory measures are so confined and are addressed
to the specific areas of compelling legislative concern, the po-
lice power would become the great leveler of constitutional
rights and liberties.' 99
195. Id. at 152-53.
196. The Court indicated that the right of privacy could be grounded on either
of two constitutional foundations:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amend-
ment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 153.
197. Id. at 153-54.
198. A therapeutic abortion is one induced to protect the mother's life or
health. id. at 138, 163-64.
199. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 216 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Persistent problems would have been created in the name of local
experimentation if the Court had not precluded the states from
setting up procedural requirements like those required in the
Georgia abortion statute patterned after the ALI model. Geor-
gia's denial of an abortion to a seemingly eligible woman, chal-
lenged in Doe v. Bolton, made clear the pyrrhic character of the
women's victories with ALI-based statutes.2 °
In striking down a strict statute and a liberal statute at the
same time, in Roe and Doe respectively, the Court tried to settle
the issue in one dramatic decision that would make headlines for
only a few days. In short, the opinion seemed designed to have
a calming effect.
B. Roe's Unascertainable Legal Basis
The calm is broken, however, when one attempts to define
the essential nature of the rights adjudicated by the Court.
Scholars will be concerned about the strain on the doctrine of fun-
damental rights,21 which the opinion expands without sufficient
explanation. Justice Blackmun established the woman's right ini-
tially without using the term "fundamental" and thus without the
usual reference to a principle of justice rooted in the "traditions
and [collective] conscience of our people."2 2  He did not discuss
whether the right involved
is of such a character that it cannot be denied without vio-
lating those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"
203
Nor did he discuss whether the doctrine of fundamental rights has
a different significance when applied to a challenge under due
process rather than equal protection. He simply established the
woman's right by quick reference to rights already established in
preceding cases.
Those antecedent rights originally may have been found in
the collective conscience, whence the right to privacy enunciated
in Griswold presumably emanated, but Justice Blackmun did not
mention "collective conscience" as he announced the new right.
He merely declared that the right to decide about abortion is en-
compassed within the rights already delineated in earlier cases.204
200. See note 17 supra.
201. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
202. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
203. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (right to counsel in capital
case held fundamental).
204. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
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After some intervening discussion of other matters, Justice Black-
mun finally used the label "fundamental,"2 5 thus triggering the
compelling state interest test.
206
In general, the Roe Court seemed to be saying that certain
decisions and certain activities could not be regulated by the
state--neither by its legislative, judicial, nor executive branches.
But the Court provided little guidance in delineating the para-
meters of such decisions and activities. May cases involving, for
example, sexual activities between consenting adults, or rights re-
specting personal health or raising children be decided under the
standard set forth in Roe?
The sleight-of-hand treatment of the fundamental rights doc-
trine should also be felicitous in such unpopular causes as homo-
sexuality, adultery, and prostitution. Thus, for example, neither
the right to homosexuality nor the right to an abortion can find
its firm roots in the traditions and collective conscience of the peo-
ple. Furthermore, a compelling state interest would be as diffi-
cult to establish for banning homosexuality as it was for proscrib-
ing abortion in Roe. There is debate about when life begins and
little hope of consensus; thus the state loses in its attempt to pro-
tect fetal life. Similarly, there is unresolvable controversy about
whether private sexual acts are immoral and little likelihood of
a scientific or moral consensus. There is also debate concerning
whether the state has an interest at all in proscribing such activity,
since there is no scientifically demonstrable harm to society.
Surely, if abortion-which does involve at least a quasi-victim in
the fetus-poses no harm to society, there can be no harm in le-
207galizing victimless sex crimes.
The Court may indeed have intended to expand the funda-
mental rights doctrine to include certain unenumerated rights
which, though lacking firm roots in American traditions and col-
lective conscience, could still defeat any purported state interest
that engenders extensive and unresolvable debate. If the Court
did intend to expand the doctrine, it should have so stated. It
should also have delineated more clearly its methodology for the
expansion, or at least indicated what type of right it would be will-
ing similarly to grant in the future.
205. Id. at 155.
206. Under the compelling state interest test, "[w]here there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960). Furthermore, the law must be shown "necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
207. Note the recent legislative trend in this direction, as exemplified by Cal-
ifornia A.B. 489 (1975), which legalizes all private sexual acts between consent-
ing adults.
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In his incisive review20 of Roe v. Wade, Professor Laurence
Tribe remarked:
One of the most curious things about Roe is that behind its
own verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment on which
it rests is nowhere to be found.20 9
Tribe then posited a type of personal decision which the Court
withdrew from state control through what he called role-allocation.
Under Tribe's model, the Court in Roe made the implicit finding
that the role of deciding whether to terminate pregnancy primarily
belonged to the woman and her physician.210
If, indeed, Roe denies to the state and allocates to the indi-
vidual the personal right to decide when and whether to have an
abortion, the Court should not obfuscate the essential tenor of such
a decision. Nor should the Court equivocate about the persons
or institutions which will be allowed to participate in the abortion
decision.
C. The Moral Implications of Roe
Roe's deference to physicians may have been the Court's way
of saying that abortion is a moral decision and that doctors are
the most appropriate arbiters of this particular moral decision.
The state seems essentially to be excluded from participating in
the abortion decision, not because abortion is a woman's private
decision but because abortion is within the physician's sanctified
domain. As Justice Blackmun said:
[Roe] vindicates the right of the physician . . . . [T]he
abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily,
a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest
with the physician.211
The Court's rationale would exclude everyone else from the medi-
cal holy of holies. The Court seemed to forbid the consideration
of any factors beyond those the doctor chooses to deem relevant.
Such unquestioned judicial deference to the medical profession
makes ominous precedent.
In stressing that abortion is essentially a medical decision, as
well as a medical procedure, the Court was simply wrong. In de-
ferring to medicine and science, it implicitly denied the relevance
of all other factors. For the immediate participants and for so-
ciety in general abortion has religious, economic, social, racial and
208. Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life
and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973).
209. Id. at 7.
210. Id. at 33 n.145 passim.
211. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 165-66.
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clearly ethical aspects.2 12  To deny the relevance of these con-
siderations is to deny guidance to those who must face the un-
answered questions about abortion.
For example, what role can the father, husband, parents, em-
ployer, welfare worker, or tax collector play in determining wheth-
er a woman may be relieved of an unwanted pregnancy? Does
the right to an abortion mean that the state has an affirmative obli-
gation to facilitate the woman's decisions? Should welfare pay for
abortions? Or, conversely, should women on relief be required to
terminate their pregnancies? Is the right to an abortion tanta-
mount to the right to insist that the fetus be destroyed? Can or
must doctors attempt to save the fetus as soon as artificial wombs
or transplants become more feasible?21 And who decides which
fetuses get access to the first artificial wombs? What if hospitals
refuse to allow a willing doctor to perform an abortion? What
if no other facilities are available? Finally, should public records
be kept of the names of women who get abortions?
Surely these multi-faceted problems should not be labeled
"medical decisions" and thus be left only to the practitioners of
medicine, especially since there is a potential "victim" involved
in the fetus. The law should not bow before the throne of science
or medicine unnecessarily; it should not blindly translate medical
or scientific "findings," statistics and techniques into legal doc-
trine, as the Court did in establishing the trimester demarcations
in Roe.
Nor should the law abstain from scrutinizing medical or sci-
entific decisions simply because medicine and science are in-
volved. Consider, for example, the question of when death
occurs, for purposes of conducting organ transplants. Transplant
teams, though made up of doctors, are not composed of disin-
terested observers; and hospitals may be less interested in a
patient's need for a life-support machine than in his ability to pay
for it. The definition of death should not be left entirely to the
doctors, and yet that conclusion is implied in Roe.
Commentators on Roe have generally been disturbed by the
opinion. Concerning the definition of the beginning of human
life, one observer has written:
212. "Abortion is at once a moral, medical, legal, sociological, philosophical,
demographic and psychological problem, not readily amenable to one-dimensional
thinking." CALLAHAN, supra note 3, at 1.
213. The Boston trial of Dr. Kenneth Edelin raises these questions, among
many others, which remain unsettled in the wake of Roe. Dr. Edelin was con-
victed of manslaughter in the death of a fetus he aborted during what may have
been the third trimester of pregnancy. The conviction is presently being appealed.
See NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1975, at 18-30.
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Our contemporary instinct inclines us to dilute any metaphysi-
cal flavoring in such questions by turning them over to
science, in this case to medicine. But for the most part the
doctors decline the assignment, their data define humanness
no better than the dictionary defines poetry. At any rate, in
our present state of biological ignorance and philosophical
pluralism, the premise that the fetus is a human person can-
not be proved or disproved to the satisfaction of all. In these
circumstances neither those who uphold the premise nor those
who deny it may gratuitously assert superior moral sensitivity
over their opponents; neither claim can rightfully push the
other off the political stage.214
Another commentator felt that the Roe Court justified abortion
on the sole ground that medical science has developed a techni-
cally safe and efficient means to that end. The writer feared this
"techno-morality":
The availability of a new technique [e.g., menstrual extrac-
tion] 215 for performing early abortions justifies a facile re-
definition of the facts and law of what an abortion kills so
that the technique may be used. 210
Quoting Thomas Szasz, Daniel Callahan discussed the deference
to medicine:
[E]ssentially nonmedicial decisions should not be dressed in
the mantle of "medical" language simply because they require
medical technology for their execution. "To be sure," [Szasz]
has written, "the procedure is surgical; but this makes abor-
tion no more a medical problem than the use of the electric
chair makes capital punishment a problem of electrical engi-
neering . . . . [This] obfuscation . . . [is explained by] the
predilection in our society to translate value judgments into
medical terms, giving the aura of settled 'scientific' judgments
and the socially impregnable status of medical legitimation. '217
If the Court insists on narrowing a problem to a single essen-
tial category, it should not choose "medical" as the essential, most
appropriate, category for abortion. Abortion more naturally fits
into the category of moral decisions21 -or more precisely, moral
214. International Conference on Abortion, THE TERRIBLE CHOICE: THE
ABORTION DILEMMA 82 (R. Cooke ed. 1968).
215. By means of menstrual extraction, a fetus can be "aborted" between 5 and
17 days after a missed menstrual period-before pregnancy can be confirmed by
a pregnancy test.
216. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORD. L. REV. 807, 859 & n.312 (1973).
217. Callahan, Abortion: Some Ethical Issues, in ABORTION, SOCIETY, AND THE
LAW 89, 96 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973), quoting in part from Szasz, The
Ethics of Abortion, HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct. 1966, at 148.
218. See International Conference on Abortion, THE TERRIBLE CHOICE: ThE
ABORTION DILEMMA 89-93 (R. Cooke ed. 1968). As Callahan writes:
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decisions which are implemented by medical procedures. But
even a correct nomenclature does not automatically solve the legal
problems. The mere labeling of abortion as a "moral" or even
"religious" or "philosophic" question does not mean that the law
should be excluded from the inquiry. Answers to such questions
regularly and significantly shape the law.219 No label should auto-
matically exclude or include the state's role in the decision.
CONCLUSION
The landmark case of Roe v. Wade invalidated every abor-
tion statute then in effect in the United States, and, in practical
effect, legalized abortion on demand in this country. The over-
turned statutes had been the product of 19th century crim-
inal legislation, which had been enacted for obscure reasons
and irregularly enforced. Nevertheless, legislatures by and large
had refrained from repealing their abortion laws, probably to avoid
grappling with the problematic debate on fetal life. On the other
hand, the public debate continued, and as a result of changing atti-
tudes towards women's role in society, abortion statutes came un-
der increasing attack. Pointing to the general emancipation of
women, proponents of abortion advocated the right of every
woman to control her own body and its procreative functions.
Like many great American political issues, the abortion contro-
versy inevitably reached the Supreme Court for resolution.
Readers of the Supreme Court opinion in Roe seek in vain
for any explanation of its jurisprudential basis, of the relationship
between morality and law, and of the true relationship between
medicine and law. Courts, and especially the Supreme Court,
should not pretend that removing legal strictures from abortion is
ethically neutral. For, as Callahan recognized,
[i]n the instance of abortion, a public decision to leave
the question up to individuals reflects at least three premises
of a highly philosophical sort: (1) that private abortion de-
cisions have few if any social implications or consequences;
(2) that there are no normative standards whatever for deter-
mining the rights of fetuses, except the standard that individ-
mhe moral problem is paramount .... [I]n ways both obvious
and subtle one's moral policy (latent or manifest) will and should shape
one's response to all other policy questions.
[i iT he moral problems keep coming to the fore as one deals
with one particular kind of abortion problem after another. This is also
to say that every "indication policy" and every "legal policy" will reflect,
and should reflect, a "moral policy."
CALLAHAN, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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uals are free to use or create any standard they see fit; and(3) that changes in law have no effect one way or another
on individual moral judgments. 220
It has been the thesis of this article that the judges them-
selves have cast their votes pro- or anti-abortion based on their
own moral values or on their assessment of the community's moral
values, in other words, on their assessment of whether the fetus'
claim to life morally outweighs the mother's desire to be relieved
of an unwanted pregnancy. If this thesis is accurate, the judges
owe their readers more candor in the opinions. Even if the thesis
is inaccurate, the judges, especially in the pro-abortion opinions,
still owe their readers a better explanation of the jurisprudential
relationship between morality and the law.
In summary, at first glance the Supreme Court Justices
reached a satisfactory conclusion in Roe and Doe. Although they
were probably motivated by the relevant factors, namely, the
change in moral sentiment about women's rights, sex, and abor-
tion, they did not discuss these basic issues. Instead, they wrote
a deceptively persuasive and soothing opinion. But the rationale
that soothes our uneasiness about abortion depends too much on
people's faith in doctors and scientists-faith that is ill-founded
when other questions arise of a medical-legal-ethical nature. In
erroneously treating abortion as a single-faceted issue, the Court
gives little guidance for the subtle, multi-faceted questions facing
us in the future.
220. Id. at 93.
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